Introduction
Global market confidence shattered as a result of a chain of huge financial collapses.
Two of the U.S. housing mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (sharing 50 percent of the U.S. housing mortgage market share) had been nationalized by the U.S. -And so, in a single week, the era of the independent investment bank has ended.
Wall Street as we've known it has ceased to exist.‖ (The Wall Street Journal 2008: 15) . According to the estimation of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), the total cost of the sub-prime housing crisis will be in the range of U.S.$400 to U.S.$600 billion (NIER 2008: 9) of Shanghai and Dubai presents some opportunities and challenges. For one thing, they are determined to greatly enhance their international financial power. As a result of this, at the moment of global bail out, the world may need to take into consideration how to engage, if not accommodate, two emerging economies which have long been reliant on the development of state driven financial centers. This paper will first illustrate the interaction between financial liberalization and globalization, and followed by using the Global Financial Centres Index 3 (GFCI3) report in 2008 to assess the international financial standard between Shanghai and Dubai against other financial centers. In addition, I shall discuss the current development of Shanghai and Dubai with a view to looking at the respective government's policies of creating their own model of international financial centre before and after the financial crisis. We will evaluate the responses of the leading economies under the current financial crisis with a view to compare the responses that were carried out a decade ago among other Asian economies.
Financial Globalization and the Emerging Financial Centers
Globalization emerged in the period between the latter half of the 19th century and the initial years of the 20th century (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999: 5) .
The notion of globalization is not new but the outcomes of globalization, such as standardization, marketization and norms adherence, nevertheless, penetrate and precipitate into every country, requiring mutual inter-dependence and assimilation to take place. Karl Polanyi's (1944) The momentum of market and the dynamic force of liberalism energize the world to grow in an unprecedented manner. Empirical studies and research recently attribute the transformation of the global economy to the market impetus and the force behind it (Chandler 1990 ).
As far as international finance is concerned, the U.S. was first confronted with a setback in the 1970s when Nixon announced the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971 (Gilpin 1987: 134) . However, the inability to maintain the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s (U.S. dollars pegged with gold) gave rise to the foundation of our current volatile financial infrastructure. (Komiya et al. 1988: 318) .
Although the U.S. financial leadership has been challenged after the 2007-09 financial crisis, the relative decline of the U.S., especially in global finance, is more complicated. As Beeson and Broome put it clearly, "As a result, the negative externalities that are potentially generated by U.S. hegemonic influence are likely to come more sharply into focus, especially if scholars examine the complex nature of In my view there is no such thing as equilibrium in financial markets because market participants are trying to discount a future which is itself shaped by market expectations. … they are shooting at a moving target rather than counting a future equilibrium. (Soros 1997: 2) His assumptions are that economic agents are not perfect and knowledge is costly. If we go back to his motto, changing is everything and no one can dominate in the financial market. We are now actually watching a game of redistribution of financial power between the state and the market witnessing the current financial market. Of course, Soros has been criticized by many that his so-called theory was not new but some sort of personal reflections and most of them are within the scope of neoliberalist doctrine. We will turn to the analysis of two emerging financial centers:
Shanghai and Dubai.
Importance of Shanghai and Dubai as International Financial Centers
In March 2008, Y/Zen Group, commissioned by the City of London, came up with the Global Financial Centres Index 3 (GFCI3) report. 4 The report used five key areas for the construction of the index. They are: people, business environment, market access, infrastructure and general competitiveness. As a result, London ranked number 1 (rating of 795) and New York ranked number 2 (rating of 786). Both therefore are considered as not just international financial centers but global financial centers (GFCI3 2008: 16) . The rest of the financial centers were categorized to fulfill various roles for international, niche, national and regional purposes. Hong Kong, ranked number 3, had a rating of only 695, far away from even New York. In other words, in the reign of financial and global monetary competition, no one can rival these two financial hegemonies. Yet, if we move down from the ladder, the competition among the rest of financial centers is as severe as that between London and New York.
Most important of all, according to the report, three financial centers will become -significantly more important over the next two to three years‖. They are Dubai (ranked 24 and rating of 585), Shanghai (ranked 31 and rating of 554) and Singapore (ranking of 4 and rating of 675) (ibid.: 6). If we do not take Singapore into consideration (which should link with Hong Kong more closely), it is intriguing to study Dubai and Shanghai because their rating had increased by 10 and 27 points respectively from the last GFCI2 in 2007. As far as the report is concerned, -A movement of between 10 and 30 points signifies that the competitiveness of a financial centre needs to be watched‖ (ibid.: 13). Dubai's financial status, according to the report, is less sensitive to change. The GFCI3 indicated that it has been evolving toward a mature and stable market in the coming two to three years. On the contrary, Shanghai, although changed rapidly in terms of rating (increasing by 27 points), it might be more volatile and susceptible to global changes. Yet, the report agreed that these two financial centers are very dynamic in terms of stability.
Development of Shanghai as International Financial Center

Shanghai's Financial Status before the 2008-09 Financial Crisis
Before the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Shanghai had already been a banking and financial center. Under the semi-colonial status, Shanghai in the 1930s was considered as very liberal and a land of opportunity in
China. Yet, after 1949, the PRC banned any activities that were considered as capitalist. Among the other cities, Shanghai was hit hard because of its capitalist and financial status. After China re-opened its doors in 1978, the idea of locating (Nie et al. 2008: 115) .
In 2005 Saxenian has demonstrated in the comparative study of the high tech centers in the East coast (the route 128) and the Silicon Valley in the U.S., the special attention from the government (more government contracts and projects were given to route 128) may actually retard the ability to innovate and to face the market competition (Saxenian 1996) . According to Liu Mingkang, Chairman of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), -Shanghai's financial sector only has about 100,000 professionals, compared with some 400,000 on Wall Street and more than 250,000 in London.‖ (Xinhua 2008 ) Obviously, such numbers of financial professionals will not be able to boost Shanghai's financial status to rival as established international financial center.
In addition, it affects the role of Hong Kong which has always been relying almost entirely on housing and financial activities to support its economic structure. Before the financial crisis, said Frank Gong, chief economist for China at J P Morgan Chase in Hong Kong, -it (Shanghai) can't compete with even its regional rival, Hong Kong, as long as rulers in Beijing refuse to make the currency fully convertible and restrict foreign investment in China's U.S.$400 billion domestic stock market.‖ (Mellor 2005) After the crisis and the granting of the official status of Shanghai, the general response from Hong Kong was that the central government was biased toward
Shanghai and more and more future policy initiatives will be shifted to Shanghai as a result. (Hong Kong Economic Journal, May 18, 2009, p. 2) . Nevertheless, given the economic rise of China, international investment in Shanghai will be manifested by the future potential of Chinese market. It appears that one of the lessons from the current crisis is that Shanghai is being transformed to not just to serve the fund-raising requirement for the Chinese government, but also given real incentives and to gradually compete with the rest of the global financial centers. In other words, the natural port facilities, the pearl industry and the commercial knowhow perpetuated Dubai's merchant status in the Gulf for decades.
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC)
Oil in Dubai, however, was found only in the early 1960s, and, from the very beginning, the government had realized that it was not sustainable in relying on oil alone, of which production actually peaked at about 420,000 barrels per day in 1991 (Pacione 2005: 257 and Davidson 2008: 101) . To keep the economy growing and to perpetuate Dubai's economic development, its leader began to initiate various economic development projects in order to diversify its economy. One of the major economic projects was to develop Dubai's infrastructure in order to enhance its future competitiveness:
In the mid-1980s, … Dubai's crown prince, Sheikh Maktum bin Rashid AlMaktum, together with his two eldest brothers, Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al-emirate's future direction. At a time when other governments in the Gulf were reacting to the war by increasing their overseas investments in the West, the AlMaktum family decided the best solution was to buck the trend by making a commitment to invest in their own domestic infrastructure so that Dubai would be able to support and enhance its existing re-export oriented commercial sector while also facilitating broader diversification away from oil in the future. Nevertheless, Dubai's financial status has been increasingly challenged by the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For example, Qatar allowed foreign players to conduct local business. Saudi Arabia's geographical location and its market size give rise to its future potential to challenge Dubai (Bhatti et al. 2006: 19) .
As a whole, the GCC may need to further develop and diversify its financial sector because they have pegged their currencies with U.S. dollars and the government is just having too much revenue. Both factors are not necessarily beneficial to develop foreign exchange rate based financial products or even government bond market. Yet, the financial sector of the GCC should be able to support beyond GCC countries.
Although Dubai is already enjoying significant advantages (such as brand name, life style, political stability, financial infrastructure, regulation and level of globalization), it should not procrastinate. Obviously, the revenue and government asset in Dubai, however, serve as counterweight to off-set some factors which may lead to better confidence building. Other than financial product development, the key question of a financial center perhaps is the ability to withstand the global financial challenges.
Dubai enjoyed lots of advantages. Other than those mentioned before, Dubai's corporate tax is very low (14.4 percent), which can rival many competitors (GFCI3 2008: 40) . In Dubai, given the depletion of oil, financial services (increasingly important) are still in competition with other government investment, tourist industry, mega property projects, etc. Dubai is having a diversified development strategy, which means government attention may be less concentrated, resulting in a possible less resolute support when facing the financial crisis. In addition, argued by Mishkin, Good institutions, however, need to be home grown; … The development of good institutions in the advanced countries took hundreds of years as they grew and adapted to local conditions. Poor countries must ultimately develop their own institutions, and the citizens of these nations must feel they have ownership of those institutions or else the institutions will be ineffective and short-lived. 1. Inflation rates should not exceed by more than 2 percent the weighted average of inflation rates in the GCC.
2. Average short-term interest rates should not exceed by more than 2 percent the average of the lowest three rates.
3. Foreign exchange reserves should cover goods imports for at least four months.
4. Annual fiscal deficit should not exceed 3 percent of gross domestic product.
5. The public debt ratio should not exceed 60 percent of GDP for the public government and 70 percent of GDP for the central government.
6. The GCC currencies should maintain a fixed peg to the U.S. dollar.
(ibid: 27-28)
The deadline for a common currency in the GCC should be in January 2010, yet, incentive among the member states in the Gulf is not particularly strong. According to the assessment of the Gulf Research Council, everything is a big change. The switch over from national currency to common currency, the implementation of the monetary union and the legal aspects all require time and adjustment of the member countries.
(The GRC Economic Research Bulletin 2008: 27) As we have discussed, the Gulf state did not feel strongly to help the international financial system after the financial crisis. Yet, a sense of regionalism has been geared up because of the global financial crisis.
Shanghai and Dubai as Emerging Financial Powerhouses?
Developing countries and emerging economies face a dilemma in terms of financial liberalization and the opening of the domestic financial market. According to Louis Pauly, They discovered too that such movements could be triggered not only by any objectively reasonable loss of confidence by those investors in the integrity of domestic financial institutions or in the value of the national currency; they could be triggered by confidence-sapping shocks originating far away.
(2008: 267)
To make profit and to do well in the financial industry, emerging countries should be able to establish a financial institution that can support the international financial system (Mishkin 2006: 12) . Shanghai and Dubai therefore can set an example to the global financial market that emerging financial centers can become responsible stakeholders to shoulder global financial system. Shanghai has developed the state-of-theart infrastructure and government incentives (as international financial center in China in 2020). Dubai has been able to use the Common Law system in the DIFC to facilitating any economic transaction. Those are good signs to bring international financial system back into the soul of the emerging financial center.
One key challenge behind Shanghai and Dubai is that they are all back up by the government. The central question investor will ask is that will the government intervene the financial center at will? What would be the benefit of having certain level of government back up? We may want to take the clock back to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and to locate any lessons.
More and more literatures nowadays suggest that a certain degree of government intervention was essential to restore confidence of the societies that were bombarded heavily by the Asian financial crisis. According to Stefanie Walter's study, only Hong Kong was successful in defending its exchange rate stability whilst keeping away the money speculators between July 1997 and August 1998. Hong Kong relied heavily on its financial and banking sector which contributed almost 85 percent of its GDP (2008: 428) . In facing the financial crisis, Hong Kong Monetary Authority faced a dilemma, either to follow the purely market force by de-linking the pegging exchange rate between Hong Kong dollars and U.S. dollars or to heavily intervene in the stock market and to use a visible hand to safeguard the exchange rate. In balancing the cost and benefit, the Hong Kong government determined to go for intervention because -Policymakers were aware of the private sectors preferences… During that year the authorities made it clear that exchange rate stability was their top policy priority‖ (Walter 2008: 429) .
The experience of far reaching consequences of the Asian financial crisis and successfulness of Hong Kong are useful in creating a platform for our discussion of the development of the international financial centers in Shanghai and Dubai. The central argument is that only when financial services have reached to a critical massare international financial centers strategically important to governments and the ‗national interest' and thus necessary to safe-guard in an emergency. Of course, the collapse of the Northern Rock in the United Kingdom and its eventual taken over by the government proved something wrong about the myth of ‗too big to fail'. The current global financial crisis suggests that state rescue plans and direct ‗buy-in' from the banking sectors are dramatic measures which are needed at such a critical juncture, justifying some degree of the presence of the government in the financial system. These seem to be emerging issues in relation to derive a useful platform between government support and market incentive in the future global financial development. 
Conclusion
